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THE SANCTUARY MOVEMENT: ABOVE THE LAW
OR BEYOND ITS REACH?
DENNIS P. RIORDAN*

INTRODUCTION

In January of 1985, the Reagan Administration launched
the sternest governmental challenge to a religious movement in
this country since the Mormon prosecutions of the last century.
Sixteen clerics and lay religious workers, including a Protestant
minister, two Catholic priests, and three nuns, all members of
the "sanctuary" movement providing succor to Central American refugees, were indicted in Phoenix, Arizona on charges of
smuggling, transporting, and harboring illegal aliens. Twelve of
the sixteen were recently on trial facing prison terms of as much
as fifteen years.
The Phoenix indictments escalated a simmering conflict between the government and religious activists to a full-blown
church-state confrontation. Four indictments of sanctuary workers had been filed in 1984, three in Brownsville, Texas and one
in Tucson, Arizona, but these cases arose from isolated instances
of transporting refugees and involved only three defendants.
The Phoenix indictment was directed at the founders and most
visible leaders of the sanctuary movement, prompting charges by
200 bishops and church leaders that the prosecution was a politically motivated effort to silence critics of federal policy toward
Central American refugees.
One need not be a social historian to appreciate the danger
of such tension between the representatives of God and Caesar.
Secular powers rarely need fear defeat at the hands of religious
forces, the execution of Thomas More on the order of Henry
VIII being a far more representative outcome of church-state
conflict than the rout of the Shah of Iran by religious fundamentalists. Friction between the first and second estates inevitably
* Dennis P. Riordan is in the firm of Riordan & Rosenthal and participated as
counsel to the defendant in United States v. Merkt, 764 F.2d 266 (5th Cir. 1985).
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erodes a society's political compact, however, and the sanctuary
battle holds that disturbing prospect.
Over strenuous objection from federal immigration officials,
municipal governments in major population centers such as Los
Angeles and San Francisco already have stated their intention to
join churches in shielding Central American refugees from deportation. No one can welcome the political and social divisions
created by the sanctuary prosecutions. Why this conflict has
arisen and how it can be resolved are the questions this essay
will address.
THE PRESIDENT VS. THE PASTORS:
THE SOURCES OF THE CONFRONTATION

In the summer of 1980, "coyotes," or commercial smugglers,
deserted a group of Salvadorans in the Arizona desert. Half died
of dehydration; the remainder stumbled into Tucson on their
hands and knees and immediately were targeted for deportation.' The response of the religious communities of Tucson to
this tragedy provided the impetus that began and continues to
sustain the sanctuary movement.
In early 1982, churches in Tucson and the San Francisco
Bay Area, another locus of large numbers of Hispanic immigrants, publicly declared they would provide sanctuary for refugees from Central America. Hundreds of other churches across
the country have joined this sanctuary network. Each takes in
Central American refugees knowing they have entered the country without being processed by immigration officials. Refugee
families are given food and clothing, are housed either in the
church proper or in the home of a parishioner, and become a
part of the religious community of that church.
While immigration officials have condemned the provision
of sanctuary as an illegal form of harboring of aliens, no church
or person associated with the movement has been prosecuted for
engaging in it alone. Rather, all five sanctuary movement indictments have been directed at religious workers who allegedly either have assisted refugees in entering the United States without
documentation or in moving refugees from border areas to safer
quarters in major cities. The movement does not deny that some
1.

BAU, THIS GROUND IS HOLY 10 (1985) [hereinafter BAU].

1986]

SANCTUARY MOVEMENT

139

of its members interview Central American emigrants in Mexico
and other countries and surreptitiously shepherd those considered to be bona fide political refugees across our national borders. Once the refugees are in the country, the movement finds a
church that will grant them sanctuary. The historical parallel favored by the movement to describe this most controversial aspect of its work is that of the Underground Railroad created by
abolitionists to aid escaping slaves in the nineteenth century.2
The sanctuary movement rests on a complex of perceptions
shared by many American religious communities. The first is
that political violence, perpetuated by forces in Central America
actively or tacitly supported by the Reagan Administration, has
produced a wave of refugees seeking to avoid death or injury by
flight to the United States. That such violence exists is not subject to dispute. Civil wars have raged in El Salvador and Nicaragua for over five years, and an insurgency among Indians in
Guatemala in the past decade was crushed at a cost of
thousands of civilian deaths. Nor does anyone doubt that the
United States has witnessed a tremendous migration of Central
American refugees over the last five years, including five hundred thousand Salvadorans alone.
That United States-backed forces play a role in Central
American violence seems apparent. The Reagan Administration
correctly claims that it has acted to curtail such violence-for
example, right-wing death squad killings in El Salvador have
dropped due to U.S. pressure. The commendable efforts of emissaries such as Vice President Bush to drive from the Salvadoran
military dozens of officers identified as active in the death
squads, however, are an acknowledgement of the role our military allies have had in the thousands of killings those squads
have committed. Furthermore, the military sweeps identified as
a major cause of Salvadoran migration are conducted with military equipment provided by the United States.
As to Guatemala, Congress terminated military aid to that
country some years ago precisely because it found that American
2. Id. at 3, 160-161.
3. Temporary Suspension of Deportationfor Nationals of Certain Countries:Hearings on H.R. 822 Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Refugees, and International
Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 4, 7 (Nov. 7,
1985)(statement of Congressman Moakley)[hereinafter Suspension Hearings].
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assistance was being used to facilitate widespread abuses of
human rights. Also it is no longer a secret that the insurgent
"contra" forces in Nicaragua have received military and economic support from Washington.
The present administration does challenge the sanctuary
movement's linking of this violence to the influx of Central
Americans witnessed in this country, maintaining that these immigrants are economic refugees seeking economic opportunity
rather than a respite from political persecution. To some extent
the administration is correct. There has always been economic
migration from Central America to the United States; it is illogical to assume it has not continued in the last few years.
It is equally nonsensical to suggest, however, that brutal
civil wars, accompanied by rampant death squad activities and
bombing of civilian populations, would not produce widespread
migration unrelated to economic motivation. In fact, research by
William Stanley, a doctoral candidate at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, employing a sophisticated regression analysis of economic and political variables has established that
there is "a strong statistical relationship between the level of political violence in El Salvador and the numbers of Salvadorans
who migrate to the U.S."4 and "that fear of political violence is
the predominant motive behind the decisions of Salvadorans to
migrate to the U.S. since 1979."5
Perhaps the pivotal perception upon which the sanctuary
movement is built is that of an inequitable application by our
government of refugee law. Under the 1980 Refugee Act,6 a person possessing a "well-founded fear of persecution on account of
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group, or political opinion" is entitled to political asylum in the
United States.7 The movement claims that the 1980 Act is being
enforced selectively so as to provide asylum only to those fleeing
governments at odds with the United States-for example, Iran,
Nicaragua, and Afghanistan-while denying it to those equally
4.

Stanley, Economic Migrants or Refugees From Violence? A Time Series Analysis

of SalvadoranMigration to the United States, reprintedin Suspension Hearings,supra
note 3, at 125, 126 [hereinafter Stanley].
5. Stanley, supra note 4 reprinted in Suspension Hearings, supra note 3, at 157.
6. Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 109(Mar. 17, 1980).
7. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(1982).
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meritorious applicants fleeing regimes the United States supports, notably El Salvador and Guatemala.
Statistics are a grossly imprecise tool by which to measure
the results of a process as dependent on non-quantitative variables as is asylum adjudication. Nonetheless, the disparities in
the success of asylum applicants on a country by country basis
lend support to the sanctuary thesis. In fiscal year 1984, applicants from Guatemala were granted asylum in less than one percent of the cases decided; Salvadorans, at 2.5 percent, fared little
better. These figures are in striking contrast to an approval ratio
of approximately 20 percent in general, 32.7 percent for Poland,
40.9 percent for Afghanistan, and 60.9 percent for Iran.' An internal report of the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service
(INS) itself confirms the use of a double standard:9
[D]ifferent levels of proof are required of different asylum applicants. In other words, certain nationalities appear to benefit from presumptive status while others do
not. For example, for an El Salvadoran national to receive a favorable advisory opinion, he or she must have
"a classic textbook case."
One thing is clear. For whatever reason, our government defines its duty of humanitarian assistance to Central American
refugees far, far more narrowly than do many of America's
churches. In the government's view, a Salvadoran fleeing his village because he fears death from government air raids or guerilla
attacks is not entitled to asylum in this country unless he can
prove that he personally was the prospective target of one assault or the other. 10 Conditioned by the teaching of Deuteronomy to "love the sojourner," the churches of the sanctuary
movement maintain asylum should be available even if a refugee's name is not written on a government bomb or a guerilla
bullet. 1 It was in this wide gap between the state's view of its
8. BAu supra note 1, at 60.
9. ACLU Statement on Displaced Salvadoran Refugees, reprinted in Suspension
Hearings, supra note 3, at 226, 232 [hereinafter ACLU].
10. See, e.g., Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS, 749 F.2d 1316, 1323 (9th Cir. 1984).
11. The Supreme Court's recent decision in INS v. Cardozo-Fonseca, 107 S. Ct. 452
(1987) aids the sanctuary movement's position by recognizing that the well-founded fear
standard used in evaluating asylum claims contains a subjective component. Whether
the decision will alter the unequal fashion in which the refugee provisions of the Immi-
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humanitarian obligations and those of the churches that the
sanctuary movement was spawned. It is to possible solutions of
the conflict that we now turn.
THE FREE EXERCISE DILEMMA

The sanctuary movement's preferred solution to its conflict
with the federal government would be judicial recognition of a
constitutional privilege for religious workers to assist Central
American refugees. As demonstrated below, the movement's
claim under the free exercise clause of the first amendment may
well be sound; however, its adjudication is disfavored on procedural grounds.
The doctrinal waters of the first amendment's religion
clauses are more than a little muddy at the moment, perhaps
inevitably so given the inherent tension between the free exercise and anti-establishment safeguards.1 2 It is clear that the free
exercise guarantee under certain circumstances does protect conduct that otherwise would be proscribed by a criminal statute.
To claim a constitutional exemption from criminal prosecution
for religiously motivated conduct, a party must demonstrate
that the conduct in question was undertaken pursuant to a belief that was (at most) central to one's religion13 or (at least) sin14
cerely held.

Such a showing having been made, a religious claimant
prevails unless the government can demonstrate an interest in
the statute's application that has been variously described as
"compelling,"' 5 of the "highest order"' and of "sufficient magnigration and Nationality Act (INA) are applied on a country-by-country basis remains to
be seen. See text accompanying notes 6-9.
12. See e.g., Comment, Aid to Parochial Schools and the Entanglement of Church
and State-Aguilar v. Felton, 4 N.Y.L.S. HUM. RTS. ANN. 239 (1986).
13. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 235-236 (1972); People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d
716, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69, 394 P.2d 813 (1964) (Native American Church's use of peyote); but
see, Bowen v. Roy, -U.S.-, 106 S.Ct. 2147 (1986)(receipt of federally funded welfare
benefits).
14. Thomas v. Review Board, Indiana Employment Security Division, 450 U.S. 707,
715-716 (1981).
15. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963); see also, In re Jenison, 375 U.S.
14(1963)(remanding in light of Sherbert); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (Sunday
closing laws); West Virginia State Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 643-44(concurring opinion); Cantwell v. Connecticut 310 U.S. 296(1940).
16. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215.
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tude,' 1 7 and "essential to accomplish an overriding governmen-

' In at least some cases, the government has also
tal interest,"18
been required to prove that the statute employs the means of
achieving its objective "least restrictive" of religious practice. 19
I There is little doubt that sanctuary activity meets the
threshold constitutional test. In the first proceeding in which the
issue was raised, the prosecution of Jack Elder, director of Casa
Oscar Romero, a refugee center in Brownsville, Texas, a federal
district court found that Elder's assistance of those fleeing Central America was undertaken in fulfillment of "his Christian obligations as he genuinely perceived them to be and that Elder
presented substantial testimony to support his view of Christianity." 0 In the Phoenix cases, the government offered to stipulate to the defendants' satisfaction of the first prong of the free
exercise test, perhaps to avoid a damaging testimonial display of
the ethical and religious bases of the conduct for which they
were charged.
Whether sanctuary defendants can prevail as well on the
second prong of the test appears to turn on a question of doctrinal definition. When courts that apply the free exercise clause
permit the government to match its interest in any and all enforcement of a statute against the claim for a religious exemption, the claimant understandably loses. 2' On the other hand, if
the burden on religious activity is weighed against only the government's interest in applying the statute to those few individuals seeking exemption, religious freedom is the winner.2 It
seems obvious that had Yoder defined the state's interest as
broadly as Lee, or Lee as narrowly as did Yoder, the holding in
each case would have been turned on its head.

17. Id. at 214.
18. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257-58 (1982).
19. Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 604 (1983), and Thomas, 450
U.S. at 718-19. But see United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. at 259 (claimant in effect required
to prove absence of restriction on the government's interest, rather than vice versa).
20. United States v. Elder, 601 F. Supp. 1574, 1578 (S.D. Tex. 1985)(denying motion
to dismiss despite claim based upon free exercise of religion).
21. See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 258-259 (government's interest in
nationwide social security system outweighs Amish interest in religious exemption to
mandatory contributions).
22. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 221 (issue is not state's interest in public
education generally, but in compulsory education of Amish children in particular, and
that interest is outweighed by Amish interest in religious freedom).
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In the Elder case, the district court defined the government's interest, as in Lee, as that of "protecting a congressionally-sanctioned immigration and naturalization system
designed to maintain the integrity of this Nation's borders.""3
Having been so broadly defined, the government's interest in
having any control over its borders whatsoever naturally prevailed over Elder's in practicing his faith."
The outcome would be quite different if only the government's interest in controlling sanctuary activity were weighed in
the balance. Estimates of the number of refugees assisted by the
movement range from several hundred to three thousand. 6 This
is to be compared to the hundreds of thousands of Salvadorans
who have entered the country illegally since 1980,6 the four million or more illegal aliens in the country, and the thousands of
political refugees from other regions in the world-71 thousand
in 1984 27-upon whom the Administration bestows legal status
each year. In the face of such statistics, a finding that the republic would collapse unless the government prevents the sanctuary
movement from assisting a relative handful of undocumented
aliens appears unwarranted.
Since Jack Elder was acquitted at his first trial, no appellate
court has reviewed the denial of his free exercise claim. However, the same issue was presented before the fifth circuit and
rejected in an appeal from another trial at which Elder was convicted.2'8 Though the activist's first amendment claim remains
strong, there is nonetheless a good reason for deferring a decision, rather than rendering one, upon this issue.
The relative absence of religious strife in this country must
be attributed to a social and political climate that fosters, but
does not favor, religious activity. Since any ruling permitting an
exemption from criminal prosecution to a religious group can
fairly be attacked as a form of favoritism on the basis of membership in a particular religious cult, the rule that decisions of
23. 601 F. Supp. at 1578.
24. Id.
25. BAU, supra note 1, at 12.
26. Suspension Hearings, supra note 3 at 4, 7.
27. ACLU, at Table III, reprinted in Suspension Hearings, supra note 3, at 249.
28. United States v. Merkt, 794 F.2d 950, 954-57 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S.
Ct. 1603 (1987).
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constitutional issues should be avoided where cases can be resolved on alternative grounds should be carefully observed in
adjudicating the free exercise claims of the sanctuary
movement.2 9
THE STATUTORY SOLUTION

Whether sanctuary workers have a constitutional right to
assist Central American refugees is a question that need never
be confronted if their doing so is not prohibited by statute. Despite the government's claims to the contrary, the statutory provisions under which sanctuary workers have been charged with
illegally smuggling, transporting, and harboring refugees,"0 may
well be inapplicable to the movement's activities.
The legislative history of portions of section 1324 makes
clear that the targets of its proscriptions were commercial smugglers. As one of its authors stated:31
I do not wish to center an attack on anybody except the
smuggler and the man who tries to make money out of
the misery of some of these workers. That is what I want
29. Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. 449, 463 (1963).
30. 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1),(2), and (3)(1982), respectively. The former proviso in
§ 1324(a) allowing an exemption to employers of illegal aliens has not been at issue in
the sanctuary litigation and in the cases discussed in this article. The recent amendment
to 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a), which eliminated the employer exemption, also changed the requirements of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1-3). See The Immigration Reform and Control Act of
1986 (IRCA), Pub. L. No. 99-603, § 112(a).
The new provisions in §1324 have not dispensed with the mens rea requirement of
the former statute and thus will not be separately examined in great detail in this article.
The new section requires that the defendant's acts be undertaken with knowledge, or
with reckless disregard of the fact, that the alien is entering or within the United States
in violation of law. See IRCA § 112(a), amending 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a) (the new provisions
are designated § 1324(a)(A), (B), (C), and (D)). Former § 1324(a)(1) did not expressly
have a "knowledge" requirement, although it was interpreted by the courts as having
one. See discussion supra at notes 33 to 36 and accompanying text. The fact that all
subsections of the new § 1324(a) explicitly provide that the defendant have acted either
with knowledge, or with reckless disregard, of the fact that the alien's status in the
United States is illegal, indicates congressional endorsement of the mens rea component.
Arguably, the "reckless disregard" provisos of the new subsections broaden the frame of
mind that will allow for a conviction. Nonetheless, the argument advanced elsewhere in
this article that a defendant's good faith belief that an alien is entitled to refugee status
or asylum under the Immigration and Nationality Act, is sufficient to establish that the
defendant did not act in reckless disregard of the immigration laws. See discussion at
notes 31 to 40 and accompanying text.
31. 98 CONG. REC. 1347 (1952) (statement of Mr. Cellar).
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to get after. Certainly we do not want to get after the
good people. It is the bad at whom we aim our shafts.
Congress recognized that millions of Americans with innocent intent engage in a wide range of transactions with illegal
aliens. If these citizens were to be protected from criminal liability, mens rea had to be made the essential element of crimes
under section 1324: "[T]his bill is not intended to get after
those who desire to abide by the law. It seeks to get after those
who are endeavoring to entice innocent, harmless Mexicans over
the border to harbor, to conceal them, and to exploit them."3
That viewpoint informed not only the drafting of the statute, but the judicial interpretation of it as well. For example, in
Bland v. United States,33 the defendants were charged with illegally smuggling two anti-Castro Cubans into the United States
in violation of section 1324(a)(1).3 4 The trial court made a finding that as a matter of law the aliens the defenadants were
bringing into the country were not duly admitted. The defendants acknowledged this, but asserted that at the time of the
charged offense they had believed the Cubans were entitled to
enter and reside in the United States. Although no mens rea element is expressly stated in subsection (a)(1), the fifth circuit
recognized that such a mistaken belief was a defense to the
charge, and reversed the defendants' convictions because the the
trial court had not reiterated the nature of this defense to the
jury when it requested supplementary instructions.3 5 A conviction under section 1324(a)(1) for smuggling thus requires a defendant's personal knowledge that the alien in question is not
entitled to enter or reside in the United States.3
32. Id. at 1346 (emphasis added).
33. Bland v. United States, 299 F. 2d 105 (5th Cir. 1962).
34. 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1), Act of June 27, 1952, c. 477, Title II, ch. 8, § 274(a)(1), 66
Stat. 228.
35. 299 F.2d at 108.
36. In the current fifth circuit this is the accepted rule that has been applied concerning both subsections (1) and (2) of former 1324(a): United States v. Merkt, 764 F.2d 266
(5th Cir. 1985), reh'g. denied, 772 F.2d 904(1985). (dissenting opinion: defendant's mistake as to the legal status of transported aliens is a defense to a prosecution under §
1324(a)(2)), discussed below at text accompanying notes 46-49; United States v. Herrera,
600 F.2d 502 (5th Cir. 1979)(duress is a defense to knowingly transporting illegal aliens
under § 1324(a)(2) ); United States v. Madrid, 510 F. 2d 554 (5th Cir. 1975)(knowledge
of alien's illegal status is an element of the crime defined by § 1324(a)(2) ), rev'd on
other grounds and remanded, 517 F.2d 937 (1975); United States v. Boerner, 508 F.2d
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In another case involving Cuban refugees, the eleventh circuit held that 1324(a)(1) was not intended to outlaw "the mere
transportation of refugees seeking asylum," and thus could not
be used to prosecute those who assisted Cubans to seek political
asylum by bringing them
to the shores of this country in the
37
1980 Freedom Flotilla.
The same concern that the application of section 1324 be
limited to those with evil intent is found in decisions interpreting subsection (a)(2), the ban on transportation of illegal aliens
within the United States. 8 That subsection requires that in
transporting the illegal alien the "defendant acted willfully in
furtherance of the alien's violation of the law. ''39 Similarly, it has
1064 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1013(1975)(defendant's "guilty knowledge of
the aliens' illegal status is an essential element in establishing violation of § 1324(a)(1) );
Banderas-Aguirre v. United States (5th Cir. 1973), 474 F.2d 985 (§ 1324(a)(2) does not
presume the defendant transporting an alien in the United States knows the alien is
there illegally); United States v. Quinonez-Alvarado, 317 F. Supp. 1344 (W.D. Tex.
1970)(defendant who provides transportation to an alien must know such alien had lost
his legal status in order to obtain a conviction under § 1324(a)(2)).
In as much as the other circuits have spoken on this issue they have agreed: United
States v. Powell, 771 F.2d 1173 (8th Cir. 1985)(under § 1324 (a)(2) an inference may be
drawn from the defendants' efforts to conceal aliens that they had requisite knowledge of
the aliens' illegal status); United States v. Fierros, 692 F.2d 1291 (9th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 462 U.S. 1120 (knowledge requirement under § 1324(a)(2) is one pertaining to
alien's illegal status and not one pertaining to statutory proscriptions); United States v.
Bunker, 532 F.2d 1262 (9th Cir. 1976)(although indictment may fail to charge defendant
with requisite knowledge of alien's illegal status, evidence brought out during trial may
establish such knowledge and thereby warrant a conviction under § 1324(a)(1)); United
States v. Holley, 493 F.2d 581 (9th Cir. 1974), cert denied, 419 U.S. 861 (taxicab driver
who is aware of illegal status of passengers bears the necessary knowledge for a conviction under § 1324(a)(2)); United States v. Perez-Gomez, 638 F. 2d 215 (10th Cir.
1981)(knowledge requirement under § 1324(a)(2) is established where defendant takes
steps to hide aliens to avoid suspicion); United States v. Zayas-Morales, 685 F.2d 1272
(11th Cir. 1982), described briefly in text accompanying note 37 (defendant's knowledge
of aliens' illegal status is a requirement for a conviction under § 1324(a)(1)); United
States v. Anaya, 509 F.Supp. 289 (S.D. Fla. 1980)(concurring opinion at 300: "guilty
knowledge and criminal intent are essential elements of the crime prescribed by
§ 1324(a)(1)."). See also, United States v. Moreno, 561 F.2d 1321 (9th Cir. 1977)(employee who knowingly transports illegal alien employees while in the course of his employment is only incidentally connected to furthering the aliens' illegal presence and
such activity is not included within the statutory proscription).
37. United States v. Zayas Morales, 685 F.2d 1272, 1277 (11th Cir. 1982) (citing
Bland with approval).
38. This ban now appears in 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(B), as amended by § 112 of the
IRCA, Pub. L. No. 99-603.
39. United States v. Shaddix, 693 F.2d 1135, 1138 (5th Cir. 1982); United States v.
Moreno, 561 F.2d 1321, 1322 (9th Cir. 1977). Under the amended § 1324(a)(1)(B), as
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been held that a mistaken belief as to the legal status of an alien
whom a defendant is charged with transporting, if reasonable, is
a defense to a charge under subsection (a)(2).40
In light of this precedent, can it be said that giving sanctuary violates section 1324, properly interpreted? As far as the
bulk of sanctuary activity-the provision by churches of food,
shelter, and clothing to refugees-is concerned, the answer must
be no. The simple fact is that in following the dictates of the
Sermon of the Mount, churches and religious charities, particularly Catholic agencies in California, have been clothing, housing, and feeding illegal aliens from Central America for decades.
As Lutheran Bishop Gustav Schultz of Berkeley, a sanctuary
leader, also points out, his church, at the urging of the federal
government, provided the same services for Vietnamese refugees
in the 1970s as they now do for Salvadorans. Humanitarian assistance has been judicially viewed as beyond the reach of a statute designed to prohibit commercial exploitation of aliens.4 ' The
fact that no church or sanctuary worker has been prosecuted for
simply sheltering a Central American refugee appears to suggest
governmental recognition that this act alone does not violate
section 1324.
The "underground railroad" component of the movement
raises a very different question. The federal government always
has aggressively prosecuted smuggling of aliens into this country, conduct in which some sanctuary activists concededly engage. The precedent discussed above would suggest, however,
that even the railroad's conductors do not violate section 1324 if
they act in the belief that those immigrants they assist are entitled to enter and reside in the United States under the terms of
the 1980 Refugee Act, regardless of whether that belief is correct. A recent decision of the United States Supreme Court
lends strong support to this prosition. In Liparota v. United
States," the Supreme Court held that when knowledge of a legal
amended by § 112(a) of the IRCA, Pub. L. No. 99-603, the defendant may be convicted
for transporting an alien "in reckless disregard of the fact that [such] alien [is] in the
United States in violation of law." See note 30.

40. United States v. Fierros, 692 F.2d 1291, 1294 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103
S.Ct. 3090 (1983).

41. Moreno, 561 F.2d at 1322 n. 3.
42. 471 U,S. 419 (1985).
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status is an element of the offense charged, a mistaken belief as
to that legal status constitutes a defense.
The defendant in Liparota was charged under 7 U.S.C. section 2024(b),"' which prohibits knowingly acquiring food stamps
coupons in a manner "not authorized by [the statute] or the regulations." The evidence admitted at Liparota's trial showed that
he had purchased food stamps from an undercover agent for
substantially less than their face value, a manner of acquisition
in fact not "authorized." On appeal Liparota argued that the
trial court had erred by failing to instruct the jury that the government was required to prove that he knowingly acted in an
unlawful manner. The Supreme Court agreed and reversed
Liparota's conviction. The Court found that because knowledge
was an element of the offense charged, lack of knowledge as to
the illegality of possession constituted a defense."'
Analogously, since any violation of section 1324 requires a
defendant's knowledge that an alien he assists is not entitled to
enter or reside in the United States or that he is in the country
in violation of law,45 a sincere belief, or at least a reasonable one,
in the alien's entitlement to enter and enjoy political asylum
here under the 1980 Act would relieve that defendant of criminal liability. The validity of this mental state defense has yet to
be determined, although a divided panel appeared to reject it in
some unconvincing dicta in the first sanctuary case in which the
issue was raised. In United States v. Merkt,4e the defendant was
convicted of transporting illegal aliens after being arrested while
taking Salvadoran refugees from the Texas border to San
Antonio. The Fifth Circuit unanimously reversed the defendant's conviction because the trial court had failed to instruct the
jury that Merkt could not be convicted if her ultimate intention7
had been to assist the refugees in applying for political asylum.

Relying on the oft-cited maxim that "ignorance of the law
will not excuse," a majority of the panel went on to reject
43. 78 Stat. 708, as amended.
44. 471 U.S. at 425-26.
45. Bland v. United States, 299 F.2d 105, 108 (5th Cir. 1962); See also, United States
v. Moreno, 561 F.2d 1321 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v. Fierros, 692 F.2d 1291 (9th
Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S.Ct (1983).
46. 764 F.2d 266 (5th Cir. 1985), reh'g. denied, 772 F.2d 904(1985).
47. 764 F.2d at 272.
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Merkt's broader contention that her belief that the refugees
were entitled to asylum and were thus legally in this country
constituted a complete defense to the crime.4 8 The majority,
however, failed to distinguish or even cite Liparota. Judge Alvin
Rubin, in dissenting from this portion of the Merkt decision, relied upon Liparota stating:49
The defendant's knowledge of the alien's illegal status is
an essential element of the offense, which the government is required to prove . . . If Merkt could establish

that she was ignorant of the true legal status of the two
aliens, therefore, she should be allowed to assert this
state of mind, however, mistaken it was, as a defense to
her prosecution under § 1324(a)(2).
Acceptance of Judge Rubin's view, which is wholly consistent with both the legislative history of section 1324 and the
holding of Liparota, would pose no appreciable impediment to
prosecution of commercial smugglers, who have no greater success raising a "good faith" defense than one of entrapment or
insanity. Nor would it necessarily preclude proceeding against
sanctuary activists on the theory that the clandestine nature of
their activity proves their knowledge of its illegality. It would,
however, permit the movement's members to present a defense
that they firmly believe that the 1980 Refugee Act legalizes their
actions in bringing bona fide political refugees into this country,
and that they act in secret only because the government dishonors the law by refusing asylum status to Salvadorans entitled to
it.
In order to convict under this reading of section 1324, the
government would have to prove to juries beyond a reasonable
doubt that the priests, nuns, ministers, and religious faithful
who present this "good faith" defense are lying about their subjective understanding of the law. The government cannot meet
that burden. Prosecutors may well convince juries that the
movement's view of the law is wrong, but not that it is insincere.
Nor can they prove unreasonable the movement's belief that the
refugees aided by the "railroad" are entitled to asylum: they
48. Id. at 273.
49. Id. at 275(footnotes omitted).

19861

SANCTUARY MOVEMENT

have been selected for assistance precisely because their stories
of persecution are so compelling. If this limited view of the statute's scope judicially prevails, and it should, sanctuary prosecutions will be brought to a screeching halt. That would be in the
government's interest. For no case in recent memory has done
more damage to the image of federal law enforcement in this
country than have the sanctuary prosecutions.
Normally when a prosecutor frees a thief, rapist, or murderer from jail or even pays him a stipend to inform on another
criminal, nary a ripple of protest is heard. The public is either
unaware of the practice or considers it a fair bargain. But the
federal government's payment of a modern day slave trader to
infiltrate and tape church meetings in Tucson and to befriend
and later betray the Arizona sanctuary defendants prompted
condemnation on editorial pages around the country.50 It also
brought a rebuke from the trial judge, who complained that the
use of paid and wired informants in places of religious activity
meant that "the whole process has been sullied in a sense." 5 '
Furthermore, because the whole truth would damage its
case, the government has sought to limit the playing field in the
sanctuary cases. It has moved to exclude from evidence any
mention of a defendant's religious beliefs or motivations, of the
dangers refugees fled in Central America, or of international refugee law or the 1980 Act. 2 The Reagan-Meese Justice Department thus finds itself facing the same charges of distorting the
truth it so frequently levels at the defenders of the fourth
amendment's exclusionary rule.
Finally, if the Administration hoped to quell either the providing of sanctuary by churches or the criticism of its refugee
policies from religious leaders, the prosecutions have been dysfunctional. Both appear to have increased exponentially since
1984.
50. See, e.g., Hentoff, Undercover Agents Go To Church, Wash. Post, at A27 (June
14, 1985).
51.

Id.

52.

See, Sanctuary: Church Workers Face Trial, April 1985 A.B.A.J. at 19.
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CONCLUSION

There are other ways of dealing with the sanctuary movement conflict than the devices of statutory interpretation suggested here. El Salvador's President Duarte has called upon the
United States to allow Salvadorans to remain within the United
States for humanitarian reasons." Legislation has been proposed
in Congress, albeit unsuccessfully, to temporarily suspend the
deportation of Salvadorans from the United States." Allowances
could be made for those Salvadorans who have not been in the
United States illegally since January 1, 1982, and who are thus
ineligible for the amnesty provision of the recently passed Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986."5 Passage of such a bill
would hold the prospect of eliminating much of the problem
that called the sanctuary movement into existence.
Absent congressional action, the best solution to the churchstate friction caused by sanctuary prosecutions may be the simplest: the Reagan Administration should abandon them. Judicial
limitation of section 1324 to its intended scope will promote the
intelligent exercise of prosecutorial discretion under the statute.

53.
54.
55.

Duarte, Letter to the Editor, N.Y. Times, May 12, 1987 at A30.
H.R. 822, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985)(the Moakley Bill).
§ 201 of the IRCA of 1986.

